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ABSTRACT 
 
The regime of passenger rail franchising in Britain, in actual fact a form of competitive 
tendering, has been in place for over 20 years. The developments have been reported at 
past Thredbo Conferences, including by the author in 2007 and 2015. The franchising 
regime has been remarkably resilient and has been through at least five phases. Using the 
concept of regulatory cycles, this paper reviews the prospects for a sixth and possibly final 
phase. 
 
Rail statistics are reviewed and a welfare analysis of rail franchising is undertaken, building 
on and updating work presented at the Thredbo Conference in 2011. This suggests that 
franchising has been modestly welfare enhancing over the substantive phases of franchising 
to date, even though the transaction costs associated with the competition are substantial 
and apparently increasing. 
 
However, there remain concerns. Train operating costs remain high and there is strong 
Union resistance to technologies such as Driver Only Operation. This is currently 
manifesting itself in terms of industrial disputes and poor service delivery on the Southern 
franchise. There are also concerns about the costs that vertical separation of operations and 
infrastructure impose on the system and there are plans for experiments with forms of 
integration, not least for the proposed East-West railway, despite the apparent failure of the 
Wessex virtual alliance. The commissioning of High Speed 2 may well change the 
franchising model for many mainline railways, whilst the Competition and Markets Authority 
continues to push for more open access. 
 
Given this back drop, this paper will consider the pros and cons of alternative regimes, 
including public and/or private concessions. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper builds on work presented at previous Thredbo conferences and subsequently 
published in Research in Transportation Economics (Preston, 2008, 2016, Preston and 
Robins, 2013). It is structured as follows. In section 2, a very brief history of rail franchising 
(and of open competition) in Great Britain is provided, whilst in section 3 some key trends 
are reviewed. In section 4, a welfare analysis is undertaken in an attempt to assess whether 
franchising has been beneficial to society as a whole. In section 5, we discuss some issues 
concerning competition, contracts and costs, whilst in section 6 we review franchising futures. 
In section 7, we draw some conclusions. 
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2. A Brief History (Again) 
 
The history of rail franchising in Britain and elsewhere has been well recorded both by the 
author (Preston, 2001a, 2008, 2016) and that of others (Knowles, 2004, 2013, Smith et al., 
2009, Nash and Smith, 2007, 2011, Jupe, 2010, Müller, 2011). However, it also needs to be 
positioned within the wider literature on competition and ownership in rail transport (see, for 
example, Thompson, 2003). 
 
2.1  Franchising 
 
We have argued elsewhere that rail franchising has consisted of five phases to date 
(Preston, 2016), as shown by Table 1. The first phase ran from 1996 to around 2000 and 
was associated with the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF).  State owned 
national passenger rail operations were horizontally separated into 25 Train Operating 
Companies (TOCs) and franchised to the private sector in a period of a little more than a 
year in 1996/7. These franchises were typically of seven year duration and heavily 
proscribed, particularly in terms of minimum service levels. Initial assessment indicated that 
this phase was welfare positive (Pollitt and Smith, 2002).  
 
The privatisation of rail in Britain was associated with John Major’s Conservative 
Government. The election of Tony Blair’s new Labour Government in 1997 eventually led to 
a change in emphasis and the second phase of franchising that operated from around 2001 
to 2004. New Labour were committed to dealing with the railways as they found them and 
this meant in practice providing greater direction by replacing OPRAF with the Strategic Rail 
Authority (SRA). Over this period, nine TOCs were re-franchised, with an emphasis, at least 
initially, on longer and more open contracts.  However, this second phase was overtaken by 
the events that were triggered by the Hatfield rail accident in October 2000 which resulted in 
the privatised track authority, Railtrack, being placed into administration and being eventually 
replaced some two years later by Network Rail, initially a hybrid organisation set up as a 
company limited by guarantee.  Cost increases were incurred for both infrastructure and 
operations and largely as a consequence one franchise failed (Connex South Eastern), 
whilst 13 were renegotiated in one form or another. 
 
As a result, Government took greater control of the rail system in the third phase of rail 
franchising that ran from around 2005 to 2012.  The SRA was abolished and its functions 
largely transferred to the Department for Transport (DfT). Over this period 12 TOCs were re-
franchised, with in most cases a cap and collar risk-sharing scheme implemented to 
overcome concerns that post-Hatfield bidders would be excessively risk averse. These 
arrangements, which typically came into operation after four years of a franchise, involved 
TOCs sharing 50% of any fares revenue above 102% of the bid profile with the DfT (the cap). 
Conversely, DfT would make-up 50% of any revenue shortfalls between 96% and 98% of the 
bid profile and 80% of shortfalls below 96% (the collar). The outcome was that these 
arrangements seemed to encourage strategic behaviour, with bids backloaded in terms of 
premium payments and reliant on large revenue growth. There may have been incentives to 
overstate both revenue and costs at the bidding stage. There were also concerns that 
subsidy at the beginning of a franchise was being used to finance Parent Group activity and 
that, once the collar was invoked, the incentive to grow revenue was muted. The problems 
were symbolised by the successive failures of the TOC operating services on the East Coast 
Main Line; GNER (in 2007) and National Express East Coast (in 2009) (Preston, 2016, 
McCartney and Stittle, 2011). The current incumbent, Virgin Trains East Coast, was also 
reported to be facing financial difficulties in the summer of 2017 (Ford, 2017). 
 
Given problems with the cap and collar regime a fourth phase of franchising was introduced 
in 2012, with the introduction of the Subordinated Loan Facility (SLF), in essence a bond that 
was designed to discourage overoptimistic bidding. However, the first application for the 
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West Coast franchise revealed errors in the calculation of the SLF, the subsequent 
cancellation of  the West Coast franchise, the suspension of the overall franchising 
programme and the instigation of the Laidlaw Enquiry (HC 809, 2012) and the Brown Review 
(Cm8526, 2013) (see also Jupe, 2013). 
 
The fifth phase of franchising commenced in 2014, with the DfT taking what might be 
described as a horses for course approach. As of spring 2017, there have been eight re-
franchises1 let, in addition to some 12 direct awards to bridge the gaps caused by the 
suspension of the fourth phase of franchising. In order of risk increasing with the TOC, this 
phase has included management contracts (e.g. West Coast since 2012), legacy cap and 
collar arrangements (e.g. Southern up to 2015), new revenue risk sharing arrangement (e.g. 
Thameslink from 2014), revenue share and support (e.g. Greater Anglia), GDP based 
mechanisms (e.g. East Coast) and all risks with the TOC (e.g. Essex Thameside). A further 
seven awards are expected by 2022.  
 
Overall, the evolution of franchising has seen a lot of changes. The number of TOCs has 
reduced from 25 to 18, largely in an attempt to reduce the number of operators at London 
termini. Re-franchising has involved a lot of turnover, with the incumbent often losing the 
franchise (as with Stagecoach and the South Western franchise in 2017). Another feature 
has been the growth of the role of foreign ownership – currently 11 of the TOCs have some 
form of foreign control, including the involvement of the state operators from France, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. 
 
Table 1: The Five Phases of Rail Franchising 
Phase Dates Responsible 
Authority 
Achievements Assessment 
1 1996 – 2000 OPRAF 25 franchises let Initial success 
2 2001 – 2004 SRA 9 franchises re-let, 1 
failure, 13 renegotiated. 
Cost over-runs 
post Hatfield. 
3 2005 – 20012 DfT – Cap and Collar 12 franchises re-let. 2 
failures 
Revenue short-
falls. 
4 2012 – 2013 DfT – SLF 1 cancellation Short comings 
in evaluation 
5 2014 – DfT – Horses for 
courses 
9 franchises re-let by 
summer 2017. 6 more 
by 2022.  
12 Direct 
awards. 
 
2.2 Open Access 
 
An unusual feature of rail franchising in Britain is that this competition for the market has 
been accompanied by competition in the market, albeit competition that is heavily controlled 
by a regulatory body, ORR (currently Office of Rail and Road). In the first phase of 
moderation of competition, which ran from 1994 to 1999, competition was limited to flows 
that constituted less than 0.2% of a TOC’s revenue. In the second phase of moderation of 
competition, which ran between 1999 and 2002, competition was permitted on up to 20% of 
a TOC’s registered revenue. This permitted the development of niche operations on main 
lines to/from London such as Hull Trains that started operations in 2000 and were bought by 
First Group in 2003. The third phase of moderation of competition that has run since 2003 
                                                            
1 2014: Essex Thameside, Thameslink Southern Great Northern, East Coast. 2015: Northern, Transpennine 
Express, Scotrail. 2016: East Anglia. 2017 (to date): South Western, London Midland. 
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has seen ORR adopt a case by case approach based on the not primarily abstractive test. 
Further niche operations have developed with Grand Central Trains starting services to 
Sunderland in 2007 and Bradford in 2010 and being bought out by Arriva in 2011. There 
were also open access services to Shrewsbury and Wrexham between 2008 and 2011. 
Alliance Rail proposed services to Blackpool from 2018, but has been unable to procure the 
rolling stock required, whilst First Group has been awarded paths to Edinburgh, but not until 
2021, whilst there are also proposals for open access services to Southampton. Overall 
open access operations are modest, accounting for less than 1% of passenger train 
kilometres in 2015/16 but for up to 15% of long distance services on the East Coast Main 
Line. However, they do appear to have cost advantages (Rasmussen et al., 2015) and may 
have an impact on the franchised market, at least for main line services to London. 
 
3. Trends 
 
The key trends in the passenger rail market in Britain have been well documented and here 
are based on the work of Syarifuddin (2016), drawing largely from data from ORR National 
Rail Trends2. The results are shown in Figures 1 to 6 and summarised by Table 2. 
 
 Figure 1: Passenger Demand (Billion Kms) 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the fact that passenger demand has broadly doubled since the 
introduction of franchising, with growth during all phases, but particularly strong growth in 
phases 1 and 3. Some of this growth will be due to exogenous factors, notably rising 
incomes for most of the period (but not around 2008) and rising road journey times. The 
latest data shows further growth of almost 5% (to Quarter 3, 2016/17). 
 
Figure 2 shows receipts per passenger km, which we use as a proxy for fares. This shows a 
broadly stable pattern (with just a 3% increase over the whole period) but with a decrease in 
the first phase of franchising (due to fares regulation3) and modest rise thereafter. It should 
though be noted that the increase in mean receipts will be moderated by the increased 
                                                            
2http://dataportal.orr.gov.uk/ 
3 Around 50% of all fares are regulated, with increases being limited to RPI between 1996 and 1998, and to 
RPI‐1% between 1999 and 2003. Since 2004, increases of up to RPI+1% have been permitted. 
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prevalence of advanced purchase discounted tickets. As a result, ORR’s fares index shows 
substantial increases in real terms over this period. 
 
 Figure 2: Receipts per Passenger Km (£, 2014 prices). 
 
 Figure 3: Passenger Rail Supply (Train Kms, million). 
 
Figure 3 indicates that since the introduction of franchising there has been an almost 50% 
increase in train kilometres operated on the network, but that this increase was focused on 
the first three phases of franchising, with a hint that in key parts of the network capacity limits 
have been reached, with concerns that decreasing returns to density are being exhibited. 
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 Figure 4: Average Costs of Rail Operations (£ per Train Km, 2014 prices). 
 
Figure 4 shows that the average cost of rail operations has increased by over 50% since the 
introduction of franchising, with most of the increase occurring in the first two phases of 
franchising. Figure 5 show that much (but not all) of this increase was related to 
infrastructure renewal costs, with the increase pre-dating Hatfield in 2000. If pre-privatisation 
trends had been maintained, the counterfactual indicates that modest reductions in 
infrastructure renewal costs might have been expected. 
 
 Figure 5: Actual and Counterfactual Renewal Costs (£ per Train Km, 2014 prices) 
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 Figure 6: Government Support to the Railways (£ million, 2014 prices). 
Note: this is total support – most of which (particularly post 2000) is to cover infrastructure 
costs. 
 
If we use 1994/95 as the base year (as 1995/6 is distorted by privatisation receipts), overall 
Government support to the railways has increased by almost 80% in real terms. There was a 
decrease in support in the first phase of franchising (as might be expected from experience 
in other countries and sectors) but a more than doubling in the second phase, since when 
support has been broadly constant. 
 
Some recent data for 2015/16 are presented in Figure 7. This shows that of the 20 TOCs 
listed (including Caledonian Sleepers and TfL Rail), around 10 are in receipt of subsidy and 
10 are paying a premium. Only one TOC has full cost recovery, with South Western paying 
12% of its total income to Government. By contrast, for Northern around 56% of total income 
comes from Government. 
 
 Figure 7: Funding of TOCs 2015/16 (Source: ORR) 
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Table 2: Key Trends by Franchise Phase (% change) 
 
Franchise 
Phase 
Dates Demand Real 
receipts per 
pass km 
Supply Real unit  
costs 
Real 
support 
1 95/96-
00/01 
 +31 -5 +21 +20  -384 
2 01/02- 
04/05 
  +7 +4  +7 +18 +185 
3 05/06-
11/12 
 +34 +3  +11   +2      0 
4/5 12/13-
14/15 
 +10 +1   +1   +5    +1 
TOTAL  +108 +3 +46 +52  +79 
 
The main expected impact of competition for the market is reduced unit cost. For example, in 
Germany and Sweden rail tendering led to 20-30% savings (Alexanderson, 2009, and 
Alexandersson and Hulten, 2007) whilst in the Netherlands rail tendering led to 20-50% 
savings (van Dijk, 2007). Bus tendering in Great Britain led to unit cost reductions of up to 50% 
up to 2000, although there have been increases since, whilst elsewhere reductions of 35% 
were typical where there is also restructuring (Preston, 2005). This is in line with the finding 
that competitive tendering in other industries such as waste collection and hospital services 
led to savings of 20-30% (Domberger et al., 1986, 1987). However, Table 2 shows that there 
has not been a reduction of real unit costs under any of the phases of franchising, although 
there were reductions in Governmental support in the first phase, reflecting early reductions 
in costs (Cowie, 2009). 
 
4. Welfare Assessment 
 
Our welfare assessment is an update of the analysis in Preston and Robins (2013) which in 
turn built on the work of others (e.g. Wardman, 2006).  This methodology consists of a 
demand forecasting model to determine the extent to which changes can be associated with 
the privatisation policy package and to assess changes in consumer surplus and total 
revenue. Extrapolative moving average models are used to determine the counterfactual 
trends in fares, train kilometres, operating costs and capital costs.   The demand forecasting 
model was based on a simple negative exponential or semi-log time series formulation as 
follows: 
 
ܮ݊	ܲܭܯ௧ 	ൌ 	ߙ ൅ 	ߚ	ܴܲܭܯ௧ ൅ 	ߛܶܭܯ௧ ൅ 	ߜܩܦ ௧ܲ ൅ 	ߠ	ܴܲܫܸ ൅ ߤ	ܪܣܶ ൅ ߩܴܵܶܫܭܧ   (1)  
where PKMt = Passenger Kilometres in year t, RPKMt = Real Revenue per Passenger 
Kilometre in year t, TKMt = Train Kilometres in year t, GDPt = Real Gross Domestic Product 
in year t, PRIV = Privatisation Dummy Variable (1993/4 to 2005/6), HAT = Hatfield Dummy 
Variable (2000/1 to 2006/7) and STRIKE = Strikes Dummy Variable (1982/3 and 1991/2). 
The estimated coefficients of equation 1, using data from 1979/80 to 2014/15, and some 
diagnostic statistics are given in Table 3. 
  
                                                            
4 Based on 1994/95. 
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Table 3: Forecasting Model Parameters 
Coefficient Value t-statistic 
α  2.874 18.498 
β -4.779 -3.255 
γ  0.003  9.973 
δ  2.16E‐07  2.652 
θ -0.089 -6.995 
μ -0.057 -3.793 
ρ -0.063 -2.923 
Adjusted R2  0.988  
Durbin-Watson  1.439  
 
All parameters are statistically significant (at the 5% level), the model explains almost 99% of 
variation in the data and autocorrelation does not appear to be a problem. The dummy 
variables in the model indicate that privatisation suppressed demand between 1993/4 and 
2005/6 by around 8.5% (1 – exp θ) whilst the Hatfield accident suppressed demand between 
2000/1 and 2006/7 by a further 5.5% (1 – exp μ). The strikes in the years 1992/3 (ASLEF – 
train drivers) and 1991/2 (RMT - signalmen) were estimated to reduce demand by around 
6.1% (1 – exp ρ). A feature of the negative exponential specification is that demand 
elasticities are directly proportional to the relevant policy variables. At the mean values in the 
data, the elasticity of demand with respect to RPKM was computed to be -0.63, with respect 
to TKM it was calculated to be 1.15 and with respect to GDP it was found to be 0.28.  These 
values are broadly consistent with those of some other studies (e.g. Whelan et al., 2010), 
although it appeared that the TKM and GDP elasticity estimates may be affected by 
multicollinearity.  
 
The counterfactual estimates for fares, train kilometres and infrastructure and train operating 
costs are based on trend analysis of five year moving averages (after Burton et al., 2002). 
Using the model in Table 3 in conjunction with counterfactual assumptions concerning train 
km and fares, in combination with actual growth in GDP, suggests that around 35% of the 
increase in demand would have occurred in any event. 
 
We then calculate the change in welfare as: 
 
∆	ܹ ൌ	∆	ܥܵ ൅	∆	ܴܶ െ	∆	ܶܥ          (2) 
 
where  W = Welfare, CS = Consumer Surplus, TR = Total Revenue, TC = Total Costs. All 
values are expressed in 2014 prices and Δ refers to the difference between the actual 
outcome and the counterfactual. 
 
Consumer surplus can be estimated directly from equation (1) as: 
 
ܥܵ ൌ 	׬ ܲܭܯ	ܴ݀ܲܭܯ ൌ	െ ଵఉ
ெ௔௫
ோ௉௄ெ 	ܲܭܯ       (3) 
 
The abridged results of our analysis are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Changes in Welfare as a result of Rail Franchising (Present Value (PV), 
£ billion, 2014 prices) 
 Overall 
(Δ W) 
Increase in 
Infrastructure 
Costs 
Net Effect 
(Per year in brackets) 
1995/6 
– 2000/1 
+2.2  +1.4  +3.6 
(+0.6) 
2001/2 
– 2004/5 
-11.7 +12.1  +0.4 
(+0.1) 
2005/6  
– 2011/12 
 -8.0 +13.0  +5.0 
(+0.7) 
2012/13 
 - 2014/15 
 -1.9  +6.4  +4.5 
(+1.5) 
Total -19.4 +32.9 +13.5 
(+0.7) 
 
It can be seen that overall welfare has reduced by over £19 billion PV over 20 years (using a 
3.5% interest rate). However, the main cause of this outcome was the substantial increase in 
infrastructure costs compared to the counterfactual of over £33 billion PV over the 20 year 
study period. It could be argued that the cost increases here are nothing to do with the 
franchising process and instead relate to the way that the rail infrastructure industry was re-
organised and privatised. If this is accepted (and there are counter arguments that vertical 
separation was a necessary pre-cursor for contracting out of train operations), then 
franchising may have welfare benefits of up £14 billion PV. Furthermore, all franchising 
phases are welfare positive, although only just in the case of the second phase. Despite 
discounting, the greatest benefits per annum appear to be in the most recent phases. 
 
However, franchising is not a costless transaction. Evidence to the Transport Select 
Committee indicated that the costs per bid were as high as £5 million in 2006 and £10 million 
in 2012.  Previous work has indicated that there were 5.4 bids per franchise in the first phase, 
4.2 bids in the second phase and 3.8 bids for the third phase. Comparable data are not 
available for the fourth and fifth phases but the trade press indicate two bids per franchise 
has become the norm, although there is now a more onerous pre-qualification phase. If we 
assume that the franchisor incurs costs equivalent to one bidder per round, then we estimate 
these transaction costs as £800 million in phase one, £234 million in phase two, £576 million 
in phase three and £210 million in phases four and five (up to 2015).  The gives total costs of 
£1.82 million, based on some 43 franchise competitions. This does not include the costs 
associated with dealing with the three franchise failures or the 25 renegotiations and direct 
awards.  Moreover it does not include the set-up (and shut down) costs of OPRAF, SRA and 
DfT Rail. For example, the Public Accounts Committee estimated that the West Coast 
franchise cancellation resulted in costs of over £50 million. Although it is unlikely that such 
costs completely cancel out the welfare benefits of franchising, it is conceivable that they 
may have done so for phase two. 
 
5. Competition, Costs and Contracts 
 
We have seen above that franchising has been competitive, but competition has declined 
over time. It is of academic (but possibly also practical) interest to determine whether rail 
franchises are a common value or a private value auction (see, for example Wilson, 1992). 
We have argued previously that rail franchising may have features of a private (or 
independent) value auction in which, assuming all bidders are risk neutral, the winning bid 
increases (level of subsidy required reduces) with the number of bidders because a 
franchise will have more value for certain bidders (Preston et al., 2000).  In addition the 
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winning bid will decreases as the variance of the bid value distribution increases (i.e. the 
interval between bids increases) (McAfee and McMillan, 1987).  
 
However, there does not appear to be evidence that prices are going down (subsidy is 
increasing) as the number of bidders is reducing. Indeed the net premium that the DfT is 
receiving has increased in recent years from £316 million in 2010/11 to £622 million in 
2015/16, in out-turn prices (ORR, 2012, 2017).  This suggests that franchising could be a 
common value auction in which the winning bid can come down (i.e. subsidy goes up) as the 
number of bidders increases in order to avoid the winner’s curse. If this is the case, then 
competition does not matter, or at least does not matter in the expected direction, although 
in reality as the number of bidders increases the probability of a risk taker bidding also 
increases. Another factor is that size of the franchise may affect the auction value. It is 
conceivable that small, geographic specific franchises are of more value to certain bidders, 
whilst larger franchises only attract the attention of large holding companies that have 
common approaches to valuation. 
 
With respect to size, it should be noted that British franchises are relatively large – on 
average around 22.5 million train kms, compared to 3.3 million in Germany and 2.6 million in 
Sweden (Nash et al., 2013) – and have been getting larger. The combined Thameslink, 
Southern and Great Northern franchise operates on around 20% of the national rail network. 
The initial wisdom was that franchises were too small – splitting passenger rail operations 
into 25 was likely to result in losses of economies of scale. Early comparative modelling work 
at a European scale seemed to confirm this (SORT-IT, 1999), suggesting something like five 
or six operators was a more optimal number for Great Britain. Subsequent and more detailed 
work on TOC costs by Smith and Wheat (2012) seemed to be in broad agreement. However, 
these analyses did not take into account service heterogeneity, such as speed, rolling stock 
type, train length etc. When Wheat and Smith (2015) do this, they conclude that there may 
be some benefits from having smaller franchises. There may also be some advantages of 
eliminating franchise overlaps where they increase service density but do not increase 
heterogeneity. As an aside, it is worth noting that a potential advantage of high speed rail is 
that, by removing the fastest trains from classic rail, it can increase service homogeneity. If 
Wheat and Smith’s analysis is correct, the decision to combine both classic and high speed 
services in the proposed West Coast Partnership  franchise, although having some 
advantages in terms of strategic planning, may not be efficient in terms of operating costs. 
 
The theoretical work in Preston et al. (2000) suggested that longer contracts would require 
less subsidy. This is supported by some empirical work in Germany (Link, 2016), largely 
related to efficiencies in rolling stock provision. Similarly, Smith and Wheat (2012) indicate 
that the move to shorter contracts post-2000 led to higher subsidy requirements, but this is 
conflated by the accompanying changes in contractual arrangements, not least moving from 
competition to negotiation. Overall, empirical evidence on the impact of contractual 
arrangements on costs is emerging, but often by indirect methods. There is scope for more 
direct modelling of the bidding process, but this is heavily constrained by the commercially 
confidential nature of the data. 
 
6. Rail Futures 
 
Rail franchising has been recently reviewed by the House of Commons Transport Select 
Committee (HC66, 2017) which has questioned whether the franchising system is fit for 
purpose. It is noted the service reliability and punctuality, as measured by the Public 
Performance Measure (PPM), and customer satisfaction, as measured by the National 
Passenger Survey, have plateaued and/or are beginning to decline. There are concerns 
about the preponderance of direct awards and the fall in market interest in franchises.  There 
is support for open access, although this would require a reform of track access charges and 
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the development of a Public Service Obligation levy. It is noted that little financial risk is 
transferred to the private sector in rail franchising and there is a preference for the 
procurement of longer and smaller franchises. There is concern over the relationship 
between Network Rail and passenger operations and the misalignment between control 
periods and the franchising schedule. There remain experiments with integrated operations 
for the Scotland, South Eastern and East Midlands franchises, despite the failure of the deep 
alliance on Network Rail’s Wessex route (which ran from April 2012 to June 2015) and the 
limited up-take of the Route-level Efficiency Benefit Sharing Mechanism. There are 
proposals for the new East-West (Cambridge to Oxford) route to be developed as a virtually 
integrated concession. There seems to be some support for the notion that vertical 
separation has increased costs for Britain’s relatively dense train operations (Mizutani et al., 
2015). Doubts are expressed about the DfT’s ability to procure seven franchises between 
2017 and 2019, with a recommendation that monitoring and enforcement functions should 
be transferred to ORR. There are particular criticisms of the handling of the Thameslink, 
Southern and Great Northern franchise, where the franchisee is in dispute with the unions 
concerning the extension of driver only operation. There is particular concern over the use of 
force majeure provisions that mean that revenue losses of at least £38 million per year are 
met by public funds and of the ad-hoc revisions to the penalty thresholds. There is also 
concern of the scheduling of franchise competitions with, for example, the South Western 
franchise due to change hands in August 2017 just as the £800 million investment at 
Waterloo is likely to reach its peak in terms of disruption. 
  
Unsurprisingly, the Government rejected the assertion that franchising is not fit for purpose 
(HC 1145, 2017). Although some recommendations concerning open access and remapping 
and re-specification of franchises were supported, criticisms of the DfT were rejected, with 
the creation of the Passenger Services Directorate in 2013 being supported by the Major 
Projects Authority and its achievements recognised by the National Audit Office (HC604, 
2015). 
 
The Competition and Markets Authority has examined four options for the passenger rail 
market (CMA, 2016). These are: significantly increased open access operations; two 
franchisees for each franchise; more overlapping franchises; and licensing multiple 
operations. Detailed modelling of the open access option for three lines (East Coast, Great 
Western and West Coast) suggested substantial benefits (PV of up to £1.7 billion over 20 
years) – although these are relatively small compared to our estimate of the benefits of 
franchising over the last 20 years (see Table 2). Given the analysis above, we have doubts 
about the efficacy of overlapping franchises where these reduce economies of density and 
increase service heterogeneity. The CMA seems to have a preference for the licence system 
(Box 2, page 31), which seems to have echoes of Foster’s view of the end game for rail 
privatisation (Foster, 1994), but there are acknowledged implementation issues.  
 
Whereas the CMA is in effect calling for more private sector competition, an alternative view 
is for the re-nationalisation or de-privatisation of passenger rail (Taylor and Sloman, 2013), 
with estimates indicating that this could reduce transaction costs by as much as £1.2 billion 
per year. Given Network Rail is already in public ownership and was statistically re-classified 
as a nationalised industry in September 2014, taking the railways back into public ownership. 
As franchises come up for renewal or fail to meet their conditions, they are put into the 
hands of Directly Operated Railways who were perceived as doing a good job in running the 
East Coast Franchise (see, for example, Jupe, 2013). One complication is that the operator 
of last resort function was effectively privatised in 2015, to a consortium led by SNC Lavalin 
(formerly Interfleet Technology), whilst rolling stock would be more expensive to take into 
public ownership. Nonetheless, the Welsh Government are investigating the scope for 
setting up a not for dividend TOC (PPIW, 2016). 
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7.  Conclusions 
 
It is tempting to frame this review using the concept of regulatory cycles (Preston, 2001b, 
Gwilliam, 2008). Regulatory (and governance) failures of the publicly owned and controlled 
regime led to privatisation which in turn exhibited market failures which in turn leads to a 
return to forms of public ownership. Although this concept may have some applicability to the 
rail industry as a whole, it has less relevance to passenger operations.  To paraphrase Jupe 
(2010), policy has been more of a muddle (and a meddle). New Labour’s initial meddle 
(leading to Phase 2 of the franchising regime) was accompanied by a muddle in response to 
the Hatfield accident and the problematic implementation of the cap and collar regime and 
the subordinated loan facility (although both survive in different guises – the forecast 
revenue mechanism and parent company support, respectively). However, our welfare 
analysis indicates that this muddle has been broadly positive in its own terms, although 
different regimes may have been more beneficial for the rail industry as a whole – but that is 
for another paper. For the passenger rail market, we continue to argue that the next rounds 
of franchising might better reflect the mix between commercial and social franchises. 
‘Commercial’ franchises (particularly for longer distance services) would involve longer 
lengths, looser specifications and remain net subsidy. Competition would be provided in the 
short run by open access operators and in the longer run by competition between classic 
and high speed rail. ‘Social’ franchises (short distance commuter and regional services) 
would have a shorter length (particularly if rolling stock is publicly procured), tighter 
specification (complete contracts) and be gross cost. Where feasible, there would be 
experimentation with vertical re-integration and with micro-franchises (building on the 
experience of the Caledonian Sleeper). For the moment, it seems sensible that the 
franchising wheels should keep on turning and the end of franchising is not yet in sight.  
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